rubble or other cheap materials. 1 Communities living in these environments could not have produced our elaborate vinayas, nor would they have had any use for them. Since such communities had no steam rooms ( jentāka), for example, how could they possibly have generated elaborate rules governing their construction and use?
Clearly there is something curiously wrong here, and the early history of Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries in India must be fundamentally rethought and reexamined. But there are other equally interesting projects that also must be undertaken. Once it is allowed that, yes, both Buddhist monasticism and Buddhist monasteries had histories, that both developed and changed over time, then ÒearlyÓ Buddhist monasticismsÑand we should probably begin to use the plural seriously hereÑand the ÒearlyÓ Buddhist monastery, become only one, and certainly not the only important, object of investigation. We need no longer be implicitly or explicitly concerned primarily with the question of what Buddhist monasticisms originally were. We might be equallyÑand probably more fruitfullyÑconcerned with what at given places at given points in time they had become. We might begin to meaningfully talk about ÒearlyÓ and Òearly medievalÓ and ÒmedievalÓ and ÒlateÓ Buddhist monasticisms and to study each of these in their own right and not, for example, as mere exemplifications of the decline and degeneration of some ÒearlyÓ and largely assumed single Òideal.Ó Each of these monasticisms will need to be understood and evaluated on its own terms, and this, of course, will not be easy.
If, for example, we want to know what Buddhist monasticism had become in North India in the period between the mature Ku ān and the fifth through sixth centuriesÑthe period that for lack of a better term might be called Òthe early medieval,Ó and the period that is generally taken to be that of Òthe MahāyānaÓÑthen the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya becomes a primary source. There is an almost general agreement that this Vinaya is ÒlateÓ and was redacted and used during this period. There is the same sort of agreement that during this period this vinaya had clear connections with North India, [87] with Gandhāra, Mathurā, and perhaps Kashmir. 2 This is the good part. The bad part follows almost immediately: the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya is enormous. Sylvain Lvi has described it as Òa vast compilation,Ó as Ònearly epic,Ó as an Òimmense pot-pourri of the Buddhist discipline,Ó as ÒmonstrousÓ and Òin itself an already complete canon.Ó Huber, too, refers to it as Òthis enormous compilation,Ó and Lalou as Òthis enormous vinayaÓÑhere too there is general agreement and it is not difficult to see why. 3 The Tibetan version of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya in, for example, the Derge edition is almost four thousand folios long and takes up thirteen volumes, and even it may not be complete. It seems to lack two texts often quoted by Gu aprabha entitled the Māt kā and the Nidāna, although both may now be represented in the Tibetan traditions by what is there called the Uttaragrantha(s). 4 Large portions of its Vinayavastu have also been preserved in Sanskrit in the manuscripts from Gilgit, 5 and significant portions of its Vibha ga are also availableÑusually in truncated or crudely condensed formÑin the Divyāvadāna. 6 There is as well a Chinese translation, although it is incom [88] plete, Òfull of gaps,Ó and Òmuch less exact than the Tibetan one.Ó Lamotte, in fact, characterizes it as Òmediocre.Ó 7 The bulk of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya is, however, only a part of the bad news. Not only is this Vinaya huge, but it has also been little studied, and only a tiny portion of it has been critically edited in any language. This meansÑat the very leastÑthat anything said about it at this stage can be only tentative and provisional.
These are all serious problems, but an equally serious obstacle to any understanding of this ÒmonsterÓ is the fact that much of what it seems to contain does not correspond to what we thought we knew about the character and defining characteristics of monastic Buddhism. It has, for example, been commonly assumed or asserted that becoming a Buddhist monk involvedÑor even requiredÑrenouncing all personal property. But the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya seems to assume, or even require, something quite different. According, for example, to the Mūlasarvās-tivādin ordination formulary that has come down to us in a Sanskrit manuscript from Tibet, the candidate for ordination must be asked: ÒDo you have any debt (deya, bu lon), either large or small, to anyone?Ó If he says yes, then he must be asked: ÒWill you be able to repay this after you have entered the order (śak yasi pravrajyāya dātu )?Ó If he says no, the text says he must be sent away and he cannot be admitted into the order. Only if he says that he will be able to pay can the ordination proceed. 8 Here, in other words, the expectationÑindeed the ruleÑis that a successful candidate for Mūlasarvāstivādin ordination would not renounce private wealth but would retain it and be responsible for and able to pay any debt that was contracted prior to ordination.
These sorts of expectations are moreover found elsewhere in this Vinaya in a startling variety of contexts. The Vinayavibha ga, for example, repeat[89]edly assumes that monks will be subject to tolls and road taxes and gives rules that require monks to pay them (Derge Ca 72b.6ff ). This must mean that the redactors of this Vinaya also assumed two other things: that monks while traveling would be transporting taxable goods, and that monks would have the means to pay the taxes. That it was assumed that these were their own personal goods, and that the payments were to be made from their own resources, is made virtually certain by the fact that the Vibha ga has a separate set of rules dealing with the payment of tolls on goods that are for ritual purposes and are corporately owned, that is, that belong to the Buddha or the Dharma or the Sa ghaÑin such cases it is explicitly stated that the tolls must be paid from corporate funds (Derge Ca 76b.4Ð78a.4). In the K udrakavastu there is a rule explicitly stating that when a monk borrows (brnyas pa) a mat from another monk, and that mat is damaged by him, the borrowing monk must compensate the owner: ÒHe must either give him the price of its full value or what will satisfy himÓ (ri baÕi rin sbyin par bya ba Õ am / deÕi sems mgu bar byaÕoÑDerge Tha 49a.1). In the same Vastu, monks are explicitly told that when their property is stolen, they must not take the thieves to court but must buy back from them what they stole, even if they have to give the full price (rgyal poÕi pho brang du sbron par mi byaÕi Õon kyang sngar chos bshad nas bslang bar byaÕo / gal te mi ster na rin phyed kyis blang bar byaÕo / gal te de ltar yang mi ster na rin tshang bar byin la blang bar bya steÑDerge Tha 233b.2). And the K udrakavastu also explicitly declares that monks must carry seals (rgya bcang bar byaÕo). Such seals were meant to mark property, and the text, again, explicitly says there are two sorts of sealsÑ seals of the community and seals of individuals (rgya ni gnyis te / dge Õdun gyi dang gang zag giÕoÑDerge Tha 7b.6Ð8a.7; cf. Vinayavibha ga, Derge Ca 79b). The distinction here is particularly interesting as one of numerous instances where this Vinaya formally acknowledges the existence of individual private property ( paudgalika) and distinguishes it from corporate or communal property (sā ghika). Yet another example occurs in the Cīvaravastu. Here the problem is that terminally ill monks were dying on bedding belonging to the community (glānā asa viditā eva sā ghike śayanāsane kāla kurvanti). As a consequence, the Buddha himself is made to order the attending monk to watch closely for the signs of imminent death and, when they occurred, to move the dying monk on some pretext onto his personal bedding (śarīrāvasthā j-ātvā paudgalike śayanāsane vyājenāvatārya śāyitavya itiÑ GMs iii 2, 123.16). And this same distinction also comes into play elsewhere in the Cīvaravastu in regard to dying monks. [90] In one passage, for example, it is clearly assumed that monks normally owned or were expected to pay for any medicines they required or for any rituals that were performed on their behalf. This seems at least to follow from the fact that only in the case of very poor monks (alpaj-āta) could these be paid for out of corporate funds (sā ghika), and even then those corporate funds were to be repaid if at all possible (GMs iii 2, 124.11Ð125.9; cf. 128.1Ð131.15). The acknowledgement of paudgalika, of a monkÕs private property, occurs even in the Mūlasarvāstivādin Prātimok a. 9 The mere existence of the distinction between sā ghika and paudgalika, and the formal acknowledgment of the latter in Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic law, should in themselves put to rest any doubts about whether Mūlasarvāstivādin monks were expected to have personal property. But to well and truly bury them we probably need only glance again at the last part of the Cīvaravastu. 10 The size, finally, of some of the monastic estates that are mentioned is also impressive, and it seems clear that the redactors of this Vinaya assumed that some monastic estates would be very large indeed. One such estate is described as worth or consisting of Òa great deal of gold, three hundred thousand of goldÓ ( prabhūta suvar a tisra suvar alak ā ÑGMs iii 2, 118.11), and this elicits no comment in the text and appears to pass as completely acceptable. In fact, the Cīvaravastu even has a set of rules specifically framed to deal with large estates left by monks who were Òrich and famousÓ ( j-ātamahāpu yaÑGMs iii 2, 123.10Ð15), and here again there is not the slightest indication that such estates were considered irregular or undesirable.
At least two things, it seems, are then already reasonably clear from the material quickly summarized to this point. A great deal of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya takes for granted that the monks it was meant to govern had and were expectedÑ even requiredÑto have personal property and private wealth. If Buddhist monks were ever required to renounce private propertyÑand there are good reasons for doubting thisÑthey certainly were not by the time the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya was redacted. Some Mūlasarvāstivādin monks, those who were Òwell known and of great merit,Ó were even expected to be quite wealthy. Rather than suggest that such wealth should be renounced or avoided, this Vinaya redacted detailed rules to transmit that wealth to other monks and to shelter it from the state. The estates of men who died aputra, ÒsonlessÓÑand monks at least normally didÑotherwise went to the king, and this issue of law is twice directly addressed in the Cīvaravastu (GMs iii 2, 118.11ff, 140.14ff ).
In fact, a preoccupation with specifically legal issues is the second seemingly characteristic feature of Mūlasarvāstivādin monasticism to emerge. The redactors of this Vinaya appear to have been just as much jurists [92] as they were monks. They appear to apply to the questions of ownership and inheritance, for example, the same sort of care and precision that their colleagues working on the Abhidharma applied to the classification and definition of dharmas. Indeed, how much the ÒstyleÓ of thinking that dominates the Abhidharma owes to these monastic jurists is an open and emerging question. 11 It may be that many of the techniques and styles of exposition were first employed in constructing the vinayas. The two bodies of material at the very least have many methods in common, and Vasubandhu, for example, deals not infrequently with what are issues of monastic law. One of the best examples, perhaps, is his treatment of the rights and status of a monk who violated one of the pārājika rules but who had no intention of concealing it (Shastri, ii 646)Ñthe same topic is treated as well in the K udrakavastu (Derge Tha 102a.5Ð104b.2). But even putting these considerations aside, what we have seen so far would seem to suggest that in regard to legal questions the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya has a degree of sophistication that is certainly notable, and it appears that the redactors of this Vinaya were certainly concerned with legal precision. But this same legal sophistication and concern is also found elsewhere in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya.
The redactors of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya either adapted or invented a significant number of sophisticated financial instruments and economic devicesÑ they knew and made rules governing the use of both oral and written wills, written loan contracts, permanent endowments, monetary deposits, interest-bearing loans, negotiable securities, and even what might be called a form of health insurance. The Cīvaravastu, for example, disallows the use of nuncupative, or oral, wills by monks to dispose of their property in favor of other monks (GMs iii 2, 124.1Ð10). But this rule is also amended and clarified in both the K udrakavastu and the Uttaragrantha(s), where it is explicitly established that Buddhist monastic law does not apply to laymen and that, therefore, a nuncupative will made by a layman in favor of monks is both allowable and valid (Derge Tha 252b.3Ð254a.1 and Pa 130a.4Ð131a.3). 12 The oral disposition of property prior to death was, of course, a subject of discussion in dharmaśāstric law as well. More striking [93] still is the sanctioned use of a written will ( patrābhilekhya, patrābhilikhita) by a layman of sorts to leave all of a considerable fortune to the Community (GMs iii 2, 140.14ff ). This is most certainly the earliest reference to a written will in all of Indian literature andÑapart from a possible second reference in the DivyāvadānaÕs account of the death of AśokaÑvirtually unique. 13 Not quite so unusual are the detailed rules in both the Vibha ga and the Uttaragrantha(s) requiring monks to accept permanent endowments of cash (ak ayanīvī) and to lend that cash out on interest (Derge Ca 154b.3Ð155b.2 and Pa 265a.6Ðb.2)Ñboth the rate of interest and the instructions to be followed in writing up the loan contract here are very close to what is found in dharmaśāstric sources, especially in Yāj-avalkya. 14 And although in the Vibha ga, but not in the Uttaragrantha(s), it is the monks themselves who are to lend out the money, draw up the contract, and service the loan, the K udrakavastu contains a passage describing an arrangement, sanctioned by the Buddha, whereby a monetary deposit for the benefit of the monks is made by a layperson with a merchant, who in turn uses it as venture capital, the profit from whichÑhow much is not specifiedÑis to be distributed to the monks (Derge Tha 258a.3Ð259a.3). There is good inscriptional evidence for just such arrangements, especially from the Western Caves. 15 There are also references in our Vinaya to both monks and nuns making use of what might be called negotiable securities or promissory notes ( patralekhya, chags rgya). Our Vinaya even distinguishes between two sorts of such notes and gives separate rules for dealing with each. The Cīvaravastu rules that when promissory notes come to the Community as a part of an estate, whatever is realized from those that can be quickly liquidated (yacchīghra śak-yate sādhayitu ) must be distributed among the monks, [94] whereas those that cannot be so liquidated must be deposited in the strong room as property in common for the Community of the Four Directions (GMs iii 2, 143.7Ð.9). In the Bhik u ī-vibha ga the nun Sthūlanandā all but forces a layman to give her a promissory note (chags rgya), which he is holding, as a ÒgiftÓ for reciting the Dharma for him. Neither the practice nor the note is presented as problematic. The problem arises only when Sthūlanandā tries to collect on it. She goes to the debtor and demands quick payment. The debtor, apparently a little surprised, asks, ÒDo you, Noble One, own this (i.e., the noteÑÕphags ma khyod mngaÕ Õam)?Ó Her answerÑ from the point of view of monks, nuns, and private propertyÑis both interesting and unequivocal: She says, ÒI am the owner (bdag dbang ngo).Ó And this too is not problematic. The only problem is that the nun then threatens to take the man to court to collect on the debtÑthis, and this alone, is an offense against monastic rule, and even it is allowed, or at least involves no offense, if the nun is Òone who earns with some difficultyÓ (tshegs chung ngus khugs paÑDerge Ta 123a.5Ð124a.2).
The final example of a financial instrument that we might note here is not formally contractual and requires a short excursus. Although the whole topic has received little attention, it appears that Buddhist monasteries in India, and Buddhist monastic communities of the sort envisioned in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, were ideally suited to provide care to the old and infirm and to the sick and dying. There was, moreover, a distinct social need for such services, or at least the redactors of our Vinaya seem to have thought so. They seem to have thought that because of taboos concerning purity and pollution, brahmanical groups at least were not willing to provide services of this sort, even for their own. This much it seems can be deduced, for example, from texts like one that is found in the Śayanāsanavastu (Gnoli) 13.24Ð.33. Here it is said that a young brahmin was staying in a hostel for young brahmins (mā avakaśālā), 16 but he fell ill with vomiting and diarrhea. Rather than attend to him, however, the other brahmins, Òfrom fear of pollutionÓ (aśucibhayād ), threw him out and abandoned him. It is only the Buddhist monks Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana who, when they chanced upon him, Òcleaned him with a bamboo brush, rubbed him with [95] white earth and bathed him.Ó Because they also ÒtaughtÓ the Dharma for himÑand here this almost certainly can refer only to a kind of deathbed recitationÑhe died in a good state of mind and was reborn in heaven. The function of Buddhist monks here is hard to missÑthey, not oneÕs fellow brahmins, care for the sick and dying.
This story, however, concerns a chance encounter. Buddhist monasteries, on the other hand, at least those envisioned by the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, wereÑ unlike brahmanical hostelsÑideologically, organizationally, and even architecturally suited to provide such services. Such monasteries not only would have had ÒinfirmariesÓ but also would have had the manpower and organization to provide nurses and care to those who would otherwise not have them. The Mūlasarvās-tivāda-vinaya, moreover, put a great deal of emphasis on just such services. We have already seen a rule that was designed to provide funding for such services for poor monks who could not themselves afford it, and this is not the only rule of this kind. Elsewhere (GMs iii 2, 128.1Ð131.15), when the Buddha himself finds another poor monk sick and Òlying in his own urine and excrement,Ó he does exactly what Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana had done for the young brahminÑwith his own hands he cleans and bathes the sick monk. He then gives orders to the monks:
ÒMonks, apart from you, their fellow-monks, those who are sick have no mother, nor father, nor other relative. As a consequence, fellow-monks must attend to one another (tasmāt sabrahmacāribhi parasparam upasthāna kara īyam)! A preceptor (upādhyāya) must do so for his co-residential pupil (sārdha vihārin); a coresidential pupil for his preceptor; a teacher (ācārya) for his disciple (antevāsin); a disciple for his teacher . . . etc., etc. One who is bereft of an assembly and little known (alpaj-āta), to him the community must give an attendant monk after determining the state of his illnessÑone or two or many, even to the extent that the entire community must attend to him!Ó This is a remarkable passage. If, for example, the roles of preceptor (upā-dhyāya) and teacher (ācārya) were ever conceived of primarily in terms of teaching functions, they certainly are not here. Here both roles are defined exclusively in terms of caregiving functions, and they are also so defined elsewhere in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. Entering into the relationship of Òpreceptor/co-residential pupilÓ or Òteacher/discipleÓ is known as Òentering [96] into dependenceÓ (gnas bcas pa), and this is the one essential and indispensable relationship that every Mūlasarvāstivādin monk must enter into. The K udrakavastu, for example, says that a monk can be without a recitation teacher (klog paÕi slob dpon), but not without a monk on whom he is dependent (Derge Tha 214a.6); in the same Vastu, monks are forbidden to travel without a monk in regard to whom they have entered into dependence; and numerous monasteries were said to have passed ordinances denying traveling monks who lacked such a supporting monk the right to accommodations for even one night (Derge Tha 71b.7Ð72b.4). And it is repeatedly said: ÒThe Blessed One has ordered entering into dependence for the sake of assisting one another, and for the purpose of attending to the sickness of those who are illÓ (bcom ldan Õdas kyis kyang . . . gcig gis gcig bstang zhing na baÕi nad g-yog bya baÕi phyir gnas bcaÕ bar gnangs baÑDerge Tha 213a.1)Ñnot, be it noted, for the purposes of instruction.
These rules make, of course, for a very attractive arrangement, which if implemented would have provided for Mūlasarvāstivādin monks unparalleled security for long-term care. Given that this arrangement would have been embedded in a ÒpermanentÓ enduring institution, there would have been nothing like it in early medieval IndiaÑthese monks would have been very well looked after in their final days, and this, in turn, may have been a powerful motivating factor in an individualÕs decision to enter the order. It is at least notable that in the overwhelming majority of cases in our Vinaya in which a motive is given for individualsÕ becoming monks, that motive is connected with the fact that the individual concerned is either old or poor or without living relatives or sonless, and usually it is a combination of all four. Examples of this may be found throughout the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, in the Vibha ga (Derge Ca 90b.6, 61a.4), in the Pravrajyāvastu (Eimer ii 193), in the K udraka (Derge Tha 100a.4, 114b.6; Da 138b.5), and so on.
There are, of course, parallels for some of the arrangements and facilities at least envisioned by the redactors of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. David Knowles, for example, has said in regard to medieval England that Òin the fully developed monastery of the twelfth century facilities for care of the sick were probably greater than in any other place in the kingdom.Ó 17 But in the English caseÑindeed in much of medieval European monasticismÑwe know that such ÒfacilitiesÓ came to be an important part of monastic [97] economies and important sources of revenue, by being made available, on a limited basis, not to the poor but to the rich laity. By a series of arrangementsÑnone of which were precisely definedÑ Òconfraternity,Ó Òcorrodies,Ó entry Òad succurrendum,Ó the old, the sick, and the almost certainly terminally ill were allowed the benefits of a monk and of the monastic facilities while they were alive, with the expectation, and sometimes formal promise, that when they died, some, all, or a good share of their estates would go to the monastery. 18 Although the bald ÒexchangeÓ or ÒpurchaseÓ nature of these arrangements was often muted in the documents that recorded them, the effect was not, and both the basic arrangement and the verbal vagueness seem to have a parallel in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya.
The parallel occurs again in the Cīvaravastu in a passage already referred toÑ it is the text that makes explicit reference to the use of a written will. It concerns a wealthy layman who, in spite of repeated attempts and repeated invocations of various gods, remains childless. As a consequence, the text says, he repudiates all the gods and comes to have faith in the Blessed One (sarvadevatā pratyākhyāya bhagavaty abhiprasanna ÑGMs iii 2, 139.20), though the transition here is rather abrupt. He approaches a monk and asks for admission into the order. The initial motivating factor is that the man is ÒsonlessÓ; the implications are that he is also old; andÑas we shall seeÑhe is about to become seriously ill. The monk shaves the manÕs head and begins to give him the rules of training (śik āpada), but the rich man becomes ill, which creates an obstacle to his admission into the order ( pravrajyāntarāyakare a ca mahatā jvare ābhibhūta ). Here it is hard to miss the hand of the monastic lawyer: whoever wrote this little narrative must have been fully aware that there were rules against admitting the sick into the order and deftly avoided that difficulty by having the manÕs illness become manifest only after the initial and most visible aspects of his admissionÑthe shaving of his headÑhad occurred. The result, of course, was a thoroughly ambiguous situation from the point of view of monastic law, which involved the status of the Òshaven-headed householderÓÑvisibly a monkÑwho had not been fully admitted into the order. What obligations did the monastic community have in regard to such individuals? The monks, as was their usual practice in such ambiguous [98] situations, ask the BuddhaÑthat is to say, our text would have been seen as providing a definitive solution. The Buddha rules that monastic care must be provided for the sick man (upasthānam asya kara īyam); he rules in other words that, in this regard at least, such an individual must be treated as a member of the communityÑ Gu aprabha, incidentally, makes this interpretation explicit. 19 But the Buddha then specifically adds that such an individual must not be given the rules of training until he recovers (na tāvac chik āpadāni deyāni yāvat svastha sa v tta Ñ140.5), and the Buddha specifically rules that the monks themselves must attend to him. The BuddhaÕs rulings in effect create a new category: a sick layman who has undergone the most visible act of admission to the order but who cannot, because of his illness, be fully admitted. The text goes on to indicate that the monks are obligated to attend to such individuals even if they are taken back to their own homes. This seems to clearly indicate that the redactor was fully conscious of the fact that he was inventing a new category. He says: ÒIn regard to him [the sick householder] the designation Ôshaven-headed householderÕ aroseÓ (tasya mu o g hapatir iti sa j-ā sa v ttāÑ140. 13) .
The obligations of the monks to Òshaven-headed householdersÓ were then made matters of explicit monastic rules, but what of the obligations of the Òshaven-headed householdersÓ to the monks: what did they owe the monks? As in the case of medieval European monasticism, the language used in regard to this question is careful and ambiguous, avoiding any direct reference to sale or purchase. We move from a language of rule and obligation to a situation of unexpressedÑbut probably nonetheless definiteÑexpectation. We are simply told that when the Òshaven-headed householderÓ knew he was on the point of death, he drew up a will leaving all of his enormous estate to the monastic community, and we are explicitly told that the state itself (i.e., the king) confirmed the monastic communityÕs rightful ownership of such an estate. The arrangement here was, then, not a formally contractual one; it was rather a matter of unstated but understood practice. A wealthy layman without heirs could undergo the initial and most visible aspects of the ritual of admission into the Mūlasarvāstivādin order. As a result, the monks [99] would be obliged to care for him, especially in his final days, even if he remained at home. He in turn was expected, though not contractually obligated, to leave his entire estate to the Community, and the state formally acknowledged the legitimacy of such an arrangement.
It is also worth noting that the redactors of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya seem to have anticipated that such an arrangement would or could have resulted in considerable amounts of cash or precious materials going directly to individual monks. This, again, would seem to follow from the provisions they put in place for dealing with specific forms of property or wealth that might form a part of such an estate. They stipulated, for example, that any ma i gems, lapis lazuli, or conch shells included in the estate must be divided into two lots, one for the Dharma and one for the Community, and that, further, the CommunityÕs share must then be divided among the monks (GMs iii 2, 143.1). They stipulated that if the estate included any books or manuscripts containing non-Buddhist śāstras (bahiśāstrapustaka), those books must be sold (vikrīya) and the profit, again, divided among the monks (143.7). They stipulated too that any gold, money, or other precious metals, either worked or unworked (suvar a ca hira ya cānyac ca k tāk ta ), must be divided into three shares, and the share for the Community must again be divided among the monks themselves. 20 These provisions are completely in line, moreover, with a host of rules and practices throughout the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. In the passage already mentioned from the K udrakavastu that deals with monetary deposits made by donors with merchants, the Buddha himself explicitly orders the monks to accept money (kār āpa as) from the merchants (Derge Tha 258a.3Ð259a.3). 21 In yet another passage from the K udrakavastu, the Buddha him-self also orders monks not to divide certain kinds of expensive cloth that is given to them, but he insists that the monks must first sell the cloth for money and then divide the money among themselves (de lta bas na dge Õdun la gos kyi rnyed pa de lta bu grub pa gang yin pa de kār shā pa a dag tu bsgyur la / kār shā pa a dag bgo bar byaÕoÑDerge Tha 263a.6). In the Cīvaravastu, again monks are told that they must divide the profits among themselves after they have sold (vikrīya) property that makes up part of the [100] estate of a deceased monk (GMs iii 2, 121.2; see also 119.14). In the K udraka, the Vibha ga, and the Uttaragrantha(s), finally, monks volunteer to act as Òassistants for meritÓ (both the terms pu ya-sahāya and dharmasahāya are used) on construction projects paid for by laymen and meant for the monks. In this role the monk receives the money (kār āpa as)Ñusually a substantial amountÑfrom the laymen; hires, oversees, and pays the laborers; buys the necessary tools; and is told, for example, to use the construction funds for his food, that is to say, to buy it (mkhar len byed pas mkhar len gyi nor kho na las bsod snyoms yongs su spyad par byaÕoÑDerge Tha 193b.7; see also Derge Ca 146a.2Ð148a.6 and Pa 123a.7Ð124a.6; cf. GMs iii 4, 139.9).
There are, of course, rules in the Mūlasarvāstivādin Prātimok a that have been understood at least by modern scholars to forbid monks from engaging in almost all of these activitiesÑhandling Òmoney,Ó buying and selling, and so forth. And here we have a particularly interesting problem. It is almost certainly not safe to assume that the Vinayadharas, the monastic lawyers who compiled, shaped, and probably wrote the Vinayavastus and the Vinayavibha ga, were unfamiliar with their own Prātimok a, especially given that the Vibha ga is at least structurally based on it. But if the Vinayadharas knew their Prātimok a, then there would seem to be at least two possible explanations for what we have seen here. It is possible that the Vinayadharas chose to ignore the Prātimok aÑand could so chooseÑindicating that it was much less binding and authoritative than has been assumed. At the very least we may have to look much, much more carefully at the differences and divergencies between the prātimok as and the other expository parts of the vinaya. Those differences may be much broader and more significant than even Schlingloff has said. 22 Certainly the differences between the Mūlasarvāstivādin Bhik u ī-prātimok a and Bhik u ī-vibha ga, for example, are so great that Bu-ston at least thought that the Vibha ga was not Mūlasarvāstivādin at all. 23 We may also have much to learn about the force and construction of monastic rules from medievalists working on Western monastic codes. Louis Lekai, for example, in discussing early Cistercian [101] monastic legislation has said: ÒThe founders of C"teaux assumed a peculiarly ambivalent attitude toward the Rule of Saint Benedict. They declared their utter devotion to it, but in fact they used that venerable document with remarkable liberality. They invoked and applied it when it suited their purpose, ignored or even contradicted it when they thought that they had better ideas.Ó 24 Even more helpful perhaps is what he says about the form of early Cistercian legislation:
A further proof of both the tentative nature of new regulations and the broadminded, always compromising disposition of the chapter fathers is the wording of virtually countless statutes before as well as after 1180. The beginning of such a paragraph is always a firm command or rigid prohibition, but the end lists the exceptions, often enfeebling the text to such an extent that it can hardly qualify for more than a fatherly advice. 25 The last sentence in particular here could do good service as a description of the Prātimok a rules as they occur in the Vibha ga: they almost all begin with a Òfirm command or rigid prohibitionÓ but end with a list of ÒexceptionsÓ (anāpatti) whichÑin the Buddhist case as wellÑcan render them little more than Òfatherly advice.Ó An example of this sort of thing has already been cited above, where the rule stated unequivocally that it is an offense if a nun goes to court to collect on a promissory note, but the exception, which immediately follows, says there is, however, no offense if the nun is Òone who earns with some difficulty.Ó In the Buddhist case it has been assumed or argued that these ÒexceptionÓ clauses represent a later chronological stratum, 26 but this need not necessarily be the case. In the case of the Cistercian texts, it is known that such exemption clauses were a part of the original legislationÑthey were there from the beginningÑand their presence has been taken at least by Lekai as evidence for Òa tolerant and flexible attitudeÓ and, he says, should be taken not as Òa sign of decayÓ but as Òevidence of health and vitality.Ó 27 In fact, we do not know for sure if in the early days the [102] Prātimok as were everÑapart from liturgical contextsÑused without their Vibha gas. It is at least hard to imagine that their rulings were ever actually applied without interpretation or discussion. But even if the anāpattisÑthe exemptions, exclusions, extenuationsÑturn out to be later additions, that will make them not less but even more important for tracking the development and gradual maturation of Buddhist monastic rules.
A second possible explanation for what we have seenÑalthough this is rarely the explanation of our first choiceÑis that Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinayadharas may have known their texts far better than we do and applied to them a far more sophisticated exegesis than we can. The Prātimok a rule that has been taken to forbid the ÒhandlingÓ of ÒmoneyÓ by monks may be a case in point. We do not actually know what activity is forbidden. The verb in the Sanskrit text of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Prātimok a is udg h īyād, but this has a wide range of possible meanings, none of which are very close to ÒacceptÓ or ÒhaveÓ (this would be rather pari or prati √grah), and it has been translated in an equally wide range of ways. 28 Worse still, we do not actually know what was intended or understood by jātarū-parajata, the object of the action that was forbidden, which is conventionally translated as Ògold and silver.Ó What, however, is clear to even usÑand we must therefore assume was far clearer to Mūlasarvāstivādin monastic lawyersÑis that the rule does not refer to suvar a or hira ya or kār āpa as (Ògold,Ó Òsilver,Ó ÒmoneyÓ), and it is these things that monks own, accept, handle, and inherit in the Vibha ga, the Vinayavastus, and the Uttaragrantha(s). This can hardly be an accident and must point again to the fact that Vinaya texts, like Abhidharma texts, represent a sophisticated system of thought that works from a particular and precise definition of terms. It, again, can hardly be an accident that what is called the Òold commentaryÓ that is embedded in the Vibha ga isÑas Norman says of the Pāli VinayaÑÒreally an analysis of words ( pada-bhājanīya).Ó 29 And converselyÑeven perverselyÑa part of [103] this sophistication may be an element of intentional ambiguity. Here too an observation by Lekai in regard to Cistercian texts may not be inappropriate: ÒIn other cases the careful reader of the records may come under the impression that the wording of important statutes was made deliberately so vague or complicated that it left open a number of possible interpretations.Ó 30 Unless I am much mistaken, this too will have numerous parallels in Buddhist vinayas. The Mūlasarvāstivādin rule that has been understood to mean that monks are forbidden to engage in Òbuying and sellingÓ may be another case in point. 31 It does not refer to unqualified Òbuying and sellingÓ; nor does it referÑwhich it could easily haveÑto ÒallÓ (sarva) Òbuying and selling.Ó It refers to nānā-prakāra krayavikraya , which, of course, could mean Òbuying and selling of various sortsÓ or Òbuying and selling of many sorts.Ó Neither interpretation precludes Òall,Ó but neither requires it either. Mūlasarvāstivādin exegesis, moreover, clearly did not take it to have absolute application. The Vibha ga, for example, says that there is no fault in engaging in both unqualified buying and selling if a monk is not seeking to gain (dge slong gis rnyed pa mi Õdod pas nyo bar byed cing rnyed pa mi Õdod pas Õtshong bar byed na gnyis ka la ltung ba med do; Derge Cha 156b. 3) .
But what can be learned specifically about the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya from our larger discussion? We now know that the Buddhist monks who wrote or redacted it in early medieval North India did not share our assumptions about Buddhist monks and the renunciation of private wealth or property, and weÑunder the enormous influence of St. BenedictÑthink that this is an important element of any monastic ideal. 32 Those same monks also apparently did not have the same attitude that we do in regard to monksÕ involvement with money. They either knew monks who did, or wanted monks to do, all sorts of things that do not fit our assumptions: Pay debts and tolls and transport taxable goods; own their own furniture and have the means to pay for any damage they might do to that of other monks; carry personal seals; pay for their own medicine and healing rituals; leave estates, sometimes huge; borrow money from laymen; inherit property [104] from both other monks and laymen; accept and service permanent endowments; make loans and charge interest; accept and use negotiable securities; provide care for sick and dying laymen, with the understanding that, when the layman died, his estate would go to the monastery; and receive precious and semiprecious materials, sell books, receive gold in various forms, accept money (kār āpa as), sell the property of deceased monks, hire and oversee laborers, and buy food. And this, of course, is only a provisional list of the sorts of things that Mūlasarvāstivādin monks wereÑ in most casesÑnot only expected but also required to do by their own monastic rule. If they did not, thenÑat least in terms of monastic disciplineÑthey would not be ÒgoodÓ monks. Exactly how many such ÒgoodÓ monks there were we obviously do not know, although it is at least certain that Indian monks accepted permanent endowments and monetary deposits made with merchants; it is also certain that some Indian monks had personal seals. 33 But whether all the things described in our Vinaya actually happened matters far less than the fact that Buddhist monks who were, presumably, the acknowledged authorities on monastic discipline spent a great deal of time thinking about them in North India in the early medieval period. These wereÑagain presumablyÑmonks who were in a position to influence actual communities, literate monks who were concerned with things other than asceticism, meditation, and doctrinal study, monks who, again in their own terms, were the ÒgoodÓ monks. That they had a different perspective from ours is confirmed by at least one further observation: Unlike modern scholars, these ÒgoodÓ monks did not have much good to say about monks who did engage in asceticism, meditation, and doctrinal learning. If they mention them at allÑand they do so infrequentlyÑit is almost always with a tone of marked ambivalence, if not actual ridicule. Ascetic monks, meditating monks, and learned monks appear in our Vinaya by and large only as slightly ridiculous characters in unedifying, sardonic, and funny stories or as nasty customers that ÒgoodÓ monks do not want to spend much time around. 34 [105] The monks that the redactors of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya envisioned, and the monks that modern scholarship has imagined, are then radically different, and this difference is extremely important for the historian of Buddhism in India. The monastic ideal found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, for example, is almost certainly one of the most prominent monastic ideals that the authors of the Mahāyāna sūtras encountered, and much of what these Mahāyāna authors said is probably fully intelligible only as a reaction against this ideal. If we are ever to understand more about the Mahāyāna, we obviously are going to have to know, then, much, much more about what they were reacting to. This is our future task.
